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Introduction and Background
We consider a joint preference elicitation, pricing, and capacity allocation problem faced by a firm offering unique, one-time digital products in the form of data streams. Such products include, for example, real time webcasts of events, video on demand or videoconferencing sessions. The firm operates servers of limited capacity that are able to generate digital streams at different quality levels. The capacity is usually associated with a discrete number of connections established between the server and the customers' clients. Servers are connected to the clients through a network. Typical connections can take the form of circuits in dedicated networks, virtual circuits in ATM-like implementations, or persistent TCP connections on the Internet. The data stream products are consumed in real time with consumers having choices of different guaranteed quality levels under which they purchase them. Our research challenge is to design a preference elicitation scheme and couple that with a pricing and allocation scheme. Our decision variables determine how many subscribers to accept in a given service class and at what price, given a fixed number of service classes and a fixed capacity.
Note that we consider the servers' location to be on the edge of the network. It is important to note that in this paper we do not explicitly consider problems such as the data transmission delays over the Internet. Our analysis and proposed market mechanism focuses on the server side. In the current Internet implementation, network latency is jointly minimized by locating such servers at the edge of the network (for instance through akamai.com), as well as the adoption of broadband connection technologies. Irrespective of where the server is located, the content providers still need to be able to structure markets to generate revenues, recover technology costs and ultimately maximize profits, or in certain cases, allocative efficiency. We believe that the creation of mercantile processes for such real-time unique services is one of the largest areas of Internet expansion has been overlooked.
We contribute by providing a menu of preference elicitation, pricing and allocation schemes along with their tradeoffs. We begin by formulating the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) for our problem setting, and subsequently propose a new uniform price Multiple Vickrey Auction (MVA) alternative that is computationally efficient. While the GVA is known to be allocatively efficient and incentive compatible, it presents computational challenges in determining individual transfer payments. The MVA has the added benefit of realizing imputed commodity prices for the various services classes, a feature lacking in the discriminatory GVA approach.
For service providers that are concerned about the incentive compatibility and yet want imputed service prices, we suggest a maximal MVA (mMVA) uniform pricing scheme that trades off revenue maximization with allocative efficiency. For sake of completeness we discuss the properties of a first price pay-your-bid scheme. While NP-hard and not incentive compatible, this formulation has the perceived benefit of cognitive simplicity on the part of sellers and bidders. We believe that by understanding the theoretical, computational, and economic property tradeoffs, service providers can make informed decisions regarding which mechanism to use in the context of their markets.
The Capacitated Server
We present three motivating examples of capacitated server electronic marketplaces. In such markets, the seller has to decide on what data streams to offer, at what price, to which consumers, and at what quality. The three exemplifying markets are Internet webcasts of onetime events, video on demand and (more generally) the pricing and allocation of ATM traffic.
Interactive webcasts of concerts, high profile interviews and sporting events such as international soccer and cricket matches 1 are streamed from multi-media servers, typically located at the edge of the network. In working with streaming media, a general rule of thumb is to provide 12 KB of random-access memory for every kilobit per second of streaming (RealSystem June 2001).
Similarly, video on demand providers constantly deal with the issue of optimally managing the server capacity, or the "content shelf-space" as it is referred to in the industry. These firms serve as intermediaries between content providers, such as ESPN and Disney, and consumers in specialized high-bandwidth digital cable markets. The video on demand server's capacity is the critical link in maintaining the desirable service quality level with broadband broadcast technologies 2 . Our approach is also applicable in a more general setting that involves pricing and allocation decisions for an operator of an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) network. In ATM networks, Quality of Service (QoS) refers to specific traffic handling parameters that are adhered to for a given circuit. Managing such networks efficiently is always a challenge because of the enormous number of choices available for setting the various operational parameters. The findings of this paper can be used to derive an "optimal" bandwidth allocation plan together with a pricing system for the real time delivery of ATM services such as videoconferencing and dynamic content.
In our models we require capacity to be reserved for each consumer for the duration of the transmission of the digital streams. We recognize that solving the server side resource allocation problem is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to make these markets feasible. Joint consideration with network latency would complete the picture. However, as we demonstrate, this problem in itself has significant intractability and has not been addressed by the literature. It provides the foundation to build the structure.
In the current scenario, given that servers can simultaneously support only a finite number of connections, services are either provided free with no QoS guarantees or more recently using posted price mechanisms 3 . These markets are in their infancy, and it is safe to assume that consumers will be reluctant to pay for services that are often delivered extremely poorly with frequent breakdowns and overloads. The problem arises from the difficulty of assessing consumers' willingness to pay and allocating appropriate aggregate capacity at servers to deliver desired/required QoS. Our research provides the first steps by integrating a fair, uniform-price (for a given product), auction mechanism with a combinatorial optimization based capacity allocation that maximizes sellers revenue and facilitates QoS guarantees by reserving servercapacity for each consumer.
We assume a monopolistic seller. Note that this is not a very restrictive assumption due to the unique, one-time, nature of products being considered. Since transmission rights have to be obtained from the primary holder of the media rights, the provider typically does not face market competition for the delivery of such services.
We next motivate the need for an auction based preference elicitation scheme.
Auction Based Preference Elicitation
There are three primary types of economic resource allocation mechanisms: (i) capacity allocation mechanisms, (ii) posted price mechanisms, and (iii) auctions and negotiations.
Capacity allocation mechanisms usually are the most efficient mechanisms if the type of 2 www.divatv.com has operationalized such a delivery mechanism by providing 3.4 Mbps MPEG2 streams that can be delivered with less than 0.8-second latency by each of their servers individual customers, and thus their needs, can be identified by the controlling entity. In general, posted price mechanisms can be considered as the mathematical dual of capacity allocation mechanisms (Greenwood and McAfee, 1991) . Under this mechanism the general distribution of customer types is known, but individual customer type is not identifiable. In other words, the demand curve is known. Even though some research has been devoted to developing posted price mechanisms that can dynamically compute the prices based on changing demand (see, for example, Gupta, Stahl, and Whinston, 1997), these mechanisms are more effective when a relatively long-term demand trend is available. In this paper, we use mechanisms based on auctions because we are considering the allocation of resources for unique one-time products and services, the demand for which may not be assessable in advance. Given the context it is well known that a posted pricing mechanism may not be optimal (Wang, 1993) . It is worth mentioning that in the absence of spatial, temporal and geographic constraints online auctions are being increasingly adopted on the Internet. They are also attracting renewed interest in the vast auction literature (see Lucking-Reiley, 2000 for a review of what is being auctioned and Bapna, Goes, Gupta, 2003 for an analysis of multi-unit business-to-consumer online auctions).
We formulate and contrast four auction based preference elicitation, pricing and allocation schemes in Section 2. The primary contribution of this study is to posit an auction based market structure for eliciting preferences for information goods, followed by a knapsack formulation to determine allocation and pricing. To the best of our knowledge this approach has not been studied in the literature.
Model Formulation and Structural Analysis

Assumptions
We assume that customers have a value for service that is unknown to the provider. Further, we assume that the provider will use some price-setting mechanism and some customers may be excluded from receiving the service based on the prices they are willing to pay.
Let there be i = 1, …, I consumers in the market for j = 1,…,J different services offered by a provider. Let V ij denote customer i's valuation for service j. We assume that consumer's valuations V ij are independently distributed.
Let C represent the total bandwidth, or capacity, and let C j be the capacity consumed by service j. Finally, let x ij represent the decision variables where x ij = 1 if customer i receives service j, and x ij = 0 otherwise.
We assume that, given a price-setting mechanism and the negligible marginal cost of offering the type of digital services under consideration, a provider's objective is to either maximize revenue or allocative efficiency. We begin with the well-known GVA approach. The main idea here is to achieve allocative efficiency and to reward bidders for truth-telling by giving them discounts equal to what they bring to the table, namely their marginal product.
The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) Approach -A Primal-Dual Model
Along the lines of the model proposed by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) we begin by exploring the structure of a potential Walrasian equilibrium of the market through a primal-dual formulation. We say potential because it is not certain whether such an equilibrium exists. The primal's objective is to maximize allocative efficiency, that is allocate the goods to the agents who value them the most, while the dual is useful in determining incentive compatible prices.
. We introduce a variable y l for every feasible supply vector
Then the economy can be modeled as:
The primal's objective function maximizes the allocative efficiency. Constraints (2, 3) represent the assignment constraint, and the capacity constraint given a chosen allocation, respectively. The corresponding dual of the linear programming relaxation of (1-5) is:
o π π (9) Observe that that the dual variable π i corresponds to the bidders surplus, and p j corresponds to the unit-price for the service class j. The variable π o corresponds to the seller's revenue and the resultant discriminatory prices for bidder i in class j computed as (v ij -π i ) are non-linear. For similar economies, and the special case where the LP relaxation is integral, Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2001) develop a primal-dual algorithm that resembles an ascending price auction. In further special cases, these are truth revealing. The pricing rule for such an allocation scheme ensures that each winning bidder pays an amount equal to the sum of the losing bids that would have won had she not bid. Each bidder has the incentive to reveal their true valuations, driven by the discount in the form of their marginal contribution that is given to them.
GVA Analysis
It is important to note that the model of our problem is a more general case because of the capacity constraints. If indeed a relaxed LP model corresponding to (1-5) results in integer solutions, as it does in some instances of the underlying package assignment problem (Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2001 ) then we have a computationally efficient Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961 , Clarke, 1971 , and Groves, 1973 .
Regrettably, such a nicety is not forthcoming in this problem's context because of the presence of constraint set (3), the set of capacity constraints. Intuitively, the problem context is slightly outside the traditional combinatorial auction (package assignment or in the case of a single seller, set packing) literature where the number of distinct objects is known a priori. In the context of this study case, the number of bidders to accept in each class, i.e. the allocation, is a priori unknown (a decision to be optimized). Thus while the primal dual formulation is elegant in theory, it has significant operational and computational difficulties. Fractional solutions of the relaxed primal are certain and the very existence of Walrasian equilibrium is challenged in the problem formulation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) . Computing GVA prices would involve solving I+1 integer programs (Bikhchandani et al, 2001 ), and would be realistic only in the context of small problems or in the absence of time sensitivity.
Another significant concern, also raised by deVries and Vohra (2003) Next, we suggest an alternative formulation that is based on a sealed bid uniform price auction with a payment that is similar to the Vickrey payment.
The Multiple Vickrey Auction (MVA) Approach
If a service provider has limited computational resources and/or has the need to for real-time decision making capability, we propose an alternative knapsack formulation in the context of Vickrey based prices. The "knapsack" is a capacitated server, to be filled up with a discrete mix of services, and our problem has to have an additional non-linear constraint for auction based price discovery. The basic idea here is that within a service class, the resulting allocation be fair.
We operationalize fairness based on Foley's (1967) characterization of an envy-free allocation.
A fair allocation scheme is defined as one in which there is no instance wherein, for the purposes of revenue maximization, a consumer with a lower revealed valuation for a given service can get allocated while there exists another, with a higher revealed valuation, for the same service who is denied. We call such an auction scheme a Multiple Vickrey Auction (MVA).
The new constraint imposes the structure of a uniform price Vickrey (1961) auction. In such auctions, if there are m units of good for sale (i.e. supply is a priori known), then the m highest bids each win, and the (m+1)st bid becomes the price paid for each unit won. A seminal result is that, in absence of multi-unit demand, which is the case in our market, such a mechanism induces truth-telling from the bidders. In case bidders have multi-unit demand then Ausubel (1997) has shown that the incentive compatibility result has to be generalized to the GVA. Using Vickrey's uniform pricing rule (as is) could lead to demand reduction, and consequent inefficient allocation of resources. Yet, while theory suggests demand reduction, a recent empirical study found no evidence of it in a realistic field experimental setting. Lucking-Reiley et al (1999), contrast the uniform Vickrey pricing approach with the GVA, and find that as the number of bidders increases both the mechanisms yield statistically equivalent expected revenue. We would expect the effect of large numbers to be present in the context of the Internet markets we are considering.
The first caveat for a service provider considering a fair, uniform price in a service class, approach is that we cannot guarantee incentive compatibility given an unknown number of units to sell in a given class. However, what we gain is an alternative approach of attacking the problem from a knapsack perspective, and significant computational advantages that come along.
If each customer can only bid for one product, and the number of units being sold is known, the special pricing structure thus obtained has incentive compatibility property for customers as noted by Vickrey (1961) . Because of this desirable property the Multiple Vickrey Auction 
subject to
Multiple Vickrey Auction Analysis
Atypically, in the above formulation, there are two unknown quantities x ij and p j in the revenue maximizing objective function represented by equation (10) . It is important to define the price setting term B i+1,j for each class. The price is equal to the bid that is just after the last accepted consumer in a given class -hence the term B i+1,j . In the case that the last bid in a class is accepted we assume it to be the price setting bid. Note that this problem (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) has the elements of the general 0-1 multiple products knapsack problem with the additional constraints (11, 12) that represents the Vickrey pricing constraint, and the assignment constraint respectively. Since Recent work on multi-unit online auctions has established that both discriminatory English auctions as well as the MVA generate comparable revenues on average (Bapna, Goes, Gupta, 2000) . The MVA implementation proposed here has a significant advantage that it does not discriminate among the winners with respect to price they pay. This leads to imputed commodity prices for each of the service classes offered, a desirable feature in any market. We expect this mechanism to be more attractive to bidders and, as Vickrey (1961) noted, it reduces the probability that a bidder's own bid will affect their own price, making the revelation of values more likely. The simplicity associated with uniform pricing mechanism is likely to have an intuitive appeal to decision makers in online markets, but its hard to quantify that effect. In the next subsection we discuss the equilibrium properties of the MVA mechanism.
MVA Mechanism's Equilibrium Properties
It is useful to consider if, after the allocation, all bids and allocations were revealed to everyone, would any bidder have an incentive to move, assuming the others stayed constant?
This consideration is based on the market-microstructure literature's focus on having posterior regret free allocations (O'Hara, 1995. p. 60). This 'regret-free' price is consistent with the property found in rational expectations models incorporating the information the allocation itself reveals. It is clear that in the presence of a variable number of units of an item (service class in our context), ex-post manipulability is possible when the (m+1)'st uniform pricing rule is used.
Bidders can ex-post determine lower bids that would have, given a larger number of units, yielded a maximal solution to a revenue-maximizing provider, and hence resulted in an allocation for them at a lower price. It is also obvious that this issue is only present at the margin, and hence we expect that its impact is likely to be minimal. We formally derive the conditions necessary for realizing regret-free allocations. For expositional ease, but without any loss of generality, we assume a single service class.
Lemma 1:
In any optimal allocation using MVA the following must be true
where N is the number of bidders receiving the allocation using MVA.
Proof: By construction, since allocating to N customers maximize the revenue.
i) All the available capacity is used ii) If there exists capacity for k-1 additional bidders, then the sufficient condition for the mechanism to be regret free is
Proof:
i) If there is no capacity left then the final allocation will at most be to N consumers. Any winning bidder has to bid ≥ B N+1 , the original price, to win. Therefore, no winning bidder can change their bid and affect their own price.
ii) Note that a winning bidder l < N can benefit only if he is able to have an allocation at a new lower price. Bidder l cannot affect the price by moving to any position < N+1 since the price still will be B N+1 .
If the bidder bids in any position from N+m, where m∈ [1, N+k-1], then from Lemma 1 the following has to be satisfied (18) Note that the left term is the revenue from original price now applied to N-1 bidders since l th bidder has moved down to N+m position, whereas the term on the right is the revenue from N+m being allocated with the new bid of bidder l. The mechanism will be posterior regret free if the condition above is not satisfied for any value of m. Thus, if there exists capacity for k-1 additional bidders, then the sufficient condition for the mechanism to be regret free is
Another point worth noting is that the condition (ii) of Theorem 1 reflects an interesting tradeoff between the steepness of the valuation distribution at the margin, in particular between B N+1 and B N+k, and on the tightness of the capacity constraint. Intuitively, a smaller spread in the valuation distribution is more likely to yield results where the allocation will be to full capacity and hence the mechanism is more likely to be regret free. However, as the spread increases the dispersion in bids will be greater and the mechanism will again start converging towards being regret free.
It is also interesting to note that the optimal choice of the cutoff N implies that B N+1 is strictly greater than B N+m , where m∈ [1, N+k-1] . This insight can be used to increase the likelihood of achieving posterior regret free allocations and prices by setting a minimum step size that would correspond to the steepness of the valuation distribution at the margin. and B N+k is higher due to dispersion. The graph on the right of Figure 1 indicates that percentage regret-freeness increases with the step size, going from 85% for a 10 cent increment to 95% for a $1 increment. For both graphs, each point is an average of 30 replications.
Figure 1 -Regret-freeness as a Function of Valuation Dispersion and Step Size
Next, we consider a mechanism wherein a provider chooses to allocate all the available capacity, irrespective of revenue, while preserving fairness in allocation. and charges all accepted bidders the price of the first rejected bid in their service class. We call such a scheme a maximal MVA allocation.
Maximal MVA (mMVA) Enforces Incentive Compatibility at Cost of Revenue
Proposition 2:
The mMVA mechanism is efficient and incentive compatible.
Proof: Consider a non-revenue maximizing uniform price auction, where bidders are accepted till all the capacity is filled. Efficiency follows by, definition as goods are allocated to bidders that value them the most, and no bidder is left out if any capacity exists. Incentive compatibility proof is along the lines of Vickrey (1961) . Given a buyer's valuation, we only have to consider the case of an accepted buyer's incentive to reduce her bid, and the case of a rejected buyer's incentive to increase her bid.
Given a maximal allocation, in case 1, the buyer cannot benefit by decreasing the bid it has no effect on the price for that class. Moreover, he can potentially lose the bid, if the new bid is less than the price-setting bid. For case 2, the buyer would end up paying more than her valuation to win, which would violate individual rationality.
QED
The maximal MVA auction scheme has the benefits of computational and allocative efficiency, and incentive compatibility. From a commercial service provider's perspective, its only downside is that it is not revenue maximizing. Thus, if a service provider's objective is to maximize social welfare (say a non-profit organization) and have imputed prices, we would suggest the maximal MVA scheme. We are not aware of any comparative studies that compare the expected revenue of the GVA with the maximal MVA. This promises to fertile ground for future lab and field experimentation.
In the next subsection we examine the properties of the mechanisms on the provider's revenue. Such analysis has been largely ignored in the literature.
Provider Side MVA Mechanism Analysis
We begin by considering the structure of the provider's revenue curve.
Observation 1: The revenue curve generated by the Multiple-item Vickrey Auction is nonmonotonic.
Proof:
Here it is sufficient to show that there exists an instance for which a content provider may for Q=2, 3B/11, for Q=3, and so forth. Clearly, in this case, the provider's revenue is decreasing with increasing number of units sold. Therefore, MVA does not necessarily generate a nondecreasing revenue curve. QED.
Observation 1 indicates that a revenue-maximizing content provider using the MVA will not commit to selling the maximum possible units of service. Instead, the provider may choose not to utilize all its available capacity. In our model where several services share a common capacity, the provider does not have to commit to a specific number of acceptances for any service. Thus, any formulation of such a mechanism must jointly consider how many bidders to accept in each service class and at what prices.
It is obvious, given the non-monotonicity of the revenue curve, that a simple scan procedure that stops at the first negative swing in the marginal revenue is not appropriate to determine the optimal number of items to be sold. A single scan of the entire total revenue curve will result in an optimal decision, when there are more than one service, but such an approach will result in exponential combinations to be evaluated. However, the following key observation will help create an efficient method for searching for an optimal solution with multiple services. It is easy to see the non-monotonicity of the revenue curve and the impact of Observation 1 by considering the hypothetical bids received for a service as in Table 1 . For example, in Table 1 it is not in the provider's best interest to offer service to all customers between 1 and 8. It is in the provider's interest to provide service to customers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 8, those that have a non-negative marginal revenue contribution. The service provider will never choose to provide service to only the first 2 or the first 7 customers, even if there is available capacity. In these cases the provider's revenue is less than that obtained from providing service to just 1 or 6 customers respectively. An alternative way to characterize this property is that customer 2 will receive service if and only if customer 3 receives the service and customer 7
will receive the service if and only if customer 8 receives the service. This motivates us to introduce a simple and intuitive approach that bundles the critical customers together when some 20 customers cannot independently receive a service because of a given bid structure. Table 1 shows the two bundles that could be created for this example and the associated marginal revenues after creating these bundles.
Bundling of customers implies that either all of the bundled customers are considered for service provision or none. Note that bundling customers does not change the characteristics of the optimal solution. On the other hand, bundling customers provides a way to create a marginal revenue structure such that as soon as the first negative marginal revenue is encountered, a simple scanning algorithm can stop and find the optimal solution.
We define the type of customer bundles created in Table 1 as the minimal cardinality bundle.
It is a bundle that starts at the first customer index where the customer's marginal revenue became less than or equal to zero and ends at the first customer index where the marginal revenue becomes positive. Note that such bundles can be created as a part of data preprocessing.
Proposition 3 below proves that minimum cardinality bundling is an optimal (revenue maximizing) bundling scheme for a single service class. In this case, the minimum cardinality bundle will be the one that includes customer (i+k).
Let this bundle be called (B1). The marginal revenue for bundle (B1) will be
Equation (19) arises from the fact that since mr i , ..., mr i+(k-1) < 0, Rmax i+(k-1) = R i-1 .
Now, consider bundle (B2) that not only includes customer (i+k) but also customer (i+k+1). Since mr i+(k+1) > 0 and customer (i+k) is already part of the bundle, the marginal revenue for bundle B2 will be
Even though by including the customer (i+k+1) we may increase the marginal revenue, it could only hurt the maximum revenue by excluding the whole bundle due to higher capacity required. To see this we need consider only 2 cases:
i) When there is enough capacity to include customer (i+k+1)
In this case, after including bundle B1, the customer (i+k+1) will automatically be included since mr i+(k+1) > 0. Therefore bundles (B1) and (B2) both will provide identical revenue R i+k+1 .
ii) When there is not enough capacity to include customer (i+k+1) but enough to include (i+k)
In this case if we create bundle (B2), then, due to capacity restrictions the whole bundle could not be considered and the revenue would be R i-1 . However, bundle (B1) can be included and the revenue would be R i+k > R i-1 .
Therefore B2 is a sub-optimal bundle and the optimal bundle size is the minimal cardinality bundle. QED.
Thus under the MVA a seller has to consider the fact that every additional bidder's inclusion can potentially have a negative impact on the price of all prior accepted bidders.
First Price "Pay-Your-Bid" Auction
For sake of completeness, we present the properties of a first price pay your bid scheme in the context of our problem. It is well known that such a scheme induces bid-shading (Krishna, 2002) and bidders will not have the incentive to truth-tell. Interestingly, it also removes the structural nicety of the MVA where a seller was forced to accept all higher bids in a class if she was making a move to accept a give bid. Thus, we don't have the pseudo-polynomial complete enumeration computational nicety that we had in the MVA and the maximal MVA. One could make a case for the cognitive simplicity of such a mechanism, but the billions of second-price eBay auctions that have been conducted challenge the viability of such an argument.
Summary of Findings and Future Research
This paper contributes by coupling auction based preference elicitation schemes for information goods with knapsack based resource allocation and pricing. We do this in the context of optimizing Internet content provider's profits in the presence of unknown demand and multiple service classes. We formulate and contrast a portfolio of preference revelation and pricing and allocation schemes with respect to their theoretical and computational complexity, as well as their economic properties. We recommend that service providers who either have in-house combinatorial optimization expertise or can acquire such expertise for a net gain, and who do not necessarily need real-time solutions use the GVA. For the vast majority of commercial real-world sellers who prefer to have commodity prices, we expect that the MVA offers a nice compromise between computational and economic properties. In addition, for social welfare maximizing settings, we would recommend that service providers use the maximal MVA. We would not recommend the first-price scheme to any seller. In this research we have not considered the consumer bidding strategies explicitly. In future research we will address such issues by studying the effect of various design modifications on the consumer bidding strategies. In addition several other interesting questions arise in such markets that need to be explored. Should the provider adopt a clearing-house approach and make accept/reject decisions at regular intervals?
Should the reservation price be altered each day in such scenarios? Alternatively, would traditional yield management strategies, such as those used by airlines and hotels, enable a provider to make a probabilistic assessment of future bid patterns and consequently make instant accept/reject decisions?
